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Corporate Power is Corporate
Purpose II: An Encouragement for
Future Consideration from Professors
Johnson and Millon
Leo E. Strine, Jr.*†
I am honored to participate in this special symposium for two
scholars I have long admired. That the work of Lyman Johnson
and David Millon should be honored together is fitting, because
although each is unique in important ways, what their
scholarship shares is far more critical. That shared core is a deep
concern for how corporations and their conduct affect humanity.
Unlike so many who call themselves corporate law experts,
Professors Johnson and Millon never forget that corporate law
was created by and for flesh-and-blood human beings, having the
full range of interests that come with being human.
Thus, when they examine issues of corporate law, they are
drawn to its larger implications and not the of the moment,
micro-issues that draw attention from those modeling the effects
of termination fees, matching rights, or the like in merger
agreements. This is not to say that those sorts of studies have no
utility, but it is to say that what they seek to study is decidedly
not what is most important about the effect corporate law and
conduct has on human beings, even if one is simply looking at
those issues from the narrow perspective of what produces the
most wealth for stockholders themselves.
* Chief Justice, Delaware Supreme Court; Adjunct Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Austin Wakeman Scott Lecturer in
Law, Harvard Law School; Senior Fellow, Harvard Program on Corporate
Governance; and Henry Crown Fellow, Aspen Institute.
† The Author is grateful to Christine Balaguer, Peter Fritz, Alexandra
Joyce, Fay Krewer, and Peggy Pfeiffer for their assistance. The Author also
thanks Rick Geisenberger.
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Another word besides humanity comes to mind when one
thinks of Professors Johnson and Millon, and that is conscience.
They never yield from the view that no one occupying a position
of trust and authority over an organization that affects the many
may escape the responsibility to apply one’s conscience—one’s
sense of right and wrong—when deciding how to manage the
organization.1 For Professors Johnson and Millon, there is no
rationalizing one’s way out of making sure every action taken
meets the mirror test of being ethical and not involving imposing
unfair harm on others, in order to seek gain for the organization
and its owners.
And holding that view, Professors Johnson and Millon have
unsurprisingly taken the position that corporations “ought” to
have no duty, within the limits of their legal discretion, to make
the best interests of their stockholders the end of corporate
governance, with other constituencies only being instruments
that can be considered when that is useful to stockholders.2 Even
1. See, e.g., David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate
Personhood, 2 STAN. AGORA 39, 56–58 (2001) (“Perhaps then, the real challenge
is to discard both entity- and aggregate-based arguments for responsibility and
turn our attention instead to the individual actors and the question of their
responsibility, without regard to anyone’s status in relation to a corporation.”);
David Millon, The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of
Business Law, 24 RES. L. & ECON. 43, 53–55, 57–58 (2007) (“In the corporate law
area, state statutes, as well as some important judicial decisions, endorse a
multifiduciary conception of management's responsibility.” (citations omitted)
(quotation at 57)). See generally Lyman Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Faith and
Faithfulness]; Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of
Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135
(2012); David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility and
the Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law (Wash. & Lee Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 2010-11, 2010) [hereinafter Millon, Enlightened
Shareholder], http://ssrn.com/abstract=1625750.
2. See Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW
10–17 (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties],
http://ssrn. com/abstract=2814231 (“[The corporation] is a business entity and
socio-legal person separate and distinct from its associated persons that seeks to
advance a collective purpose that may differ from and transcend the individual
goals of its participants, even as its success depends on the joint effort of those
persons.” (quotation at 16)); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law
After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon,
Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby] (“All business corporations . . . generate

CORPORATE POWER IS CORPORATE PURPOSE II

1167

further, they argue that their view of the “ought” is, and that
corporations have no duty—even under Delaware law or other
statutes that give only stockholders enforceable rights—to make
stockholder welfare the end of corporate law.3
profit in order to survive. That is simply a fact of life. But corporate law confers
on them broad discretion to determine the extent to which they choose to temper
the pursuit of profit by regard for other values.” (quotation at 10)); Lyman
Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25
REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 273–78 (2012) (“Instead, the better view is that the law
is (and should be) agnostic on the subject of corporate purpose (quotation at
274)); Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432–38 (2013)
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law]

Likely, we are now in a period in which societal expectations of
the private business sector are shifting. As such, law rightly
adopts an enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate
purpose, even as the fiduciary obligations of directors and
managers can clash with that permissiveness because of the
need to hold such persons accountable for their conduct. Often
the deference of the business judgment rule becomes a key
mechanism for creating the necessary slack between law's
agnosticism about corporate purpose and actual governance
conduct.
(quotation at 438). See generally, David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy,
10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013).
3. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 2,
at 13–14
[W]e see Delaware as providing expressly for broad freedom of choice
as to corporate purpose. Those who form a corporation are free to
specify particular purposes in the organizational documents, subject
only to the requirement that those purposes be “lawful,” or they can
leave the matter open-ended, stating simply that ‘the purpose of the
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity.’ In the latter
case, it will be up to the board of directors, exercising its statutory
responsibility to direct the corporation’s “business and affairs,” to
determine questions of corporate purpose.
see also Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties, supra note 2, at 17
Delaware itself lacks Supreme Court precedent mandating
shareholder wealth maximization and its law is agnostic and broadly
permissive. A shareholder wealth maximization goal, to be sure, is a
permissible objective, and likely it is the predominant one given
prevailing business and professional education norms. But the
pursuit of other corporate purposes is both possible and common, and
results in a more humane and pluralistic business culture.
David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST
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It comes as no secret that I passionately agree with my
friends about the “ought” but do not agree with them about the
“is.”4 And I have been open about my fear that claiming that the
“is” reflects the “ought” will impede the work that needs to be
done to make sure that corporations conduct their affairs in the
way that is most productive for society.5
In this short essay, I do not wish to challenge my friends on
this point, but to encourage them to push their scholarship
further by considering the following perspective on their work, a
perspective that emphasizes my primary point, which is that
corporate power is corporate purpose.
In their writings, Professors Johnson and Millon often
highlight examples of for-profit corporations that do not seek to
maximize stockholder wealth, as an argument that shows that
corporate managers do not have to put the best interests of
stockholders first. But, their examples are telling. They cite
situations where the corporate electorate is controlled by a
singular interest, and that interest has goals it wishes to
maximize more than returns. To wit, they take great heart in
Hobby Lobby, a corporation controlled by a family with very
specific religious views.6 Likewise, Professor Johnson points to
L. REV. 523, 526 (2011) (“Delaware law is not committed to shareholder primacy.
Management’s duties are owed to ‘the corporation and its stockholders,’ rather
than to the shareholders alone.”).
4. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136 (2012)
[hereinafter Strine, Our Continuing Struggle]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of
Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768–86 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of
Denial].
5. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 107–
14 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, A Job Is Not a Hobby]; Strine, Our Continuing
Struggle, supra note 4, at 167–72.
6. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 2,
at 5
This company was organized in the late 1960s as an Oklahoma
business corporation by David and Barbara Green, husband and wife,
devout evangelical Christians. All of the voting stock is held by
various family trusts, not directly by the Greens themselves. The
Greens and their adult children serve as trustees of the trusts and all
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Chick-fil-A,7 a privately held, family-owned company influenced
by its founder’s religious beliefs and which closes on Sundays,
consistent with its corporate purpose “[t]o glorify God by being a
faithful steward of all that is entrusted to us and to have a
positive influence on all who come into contact with Chick-fil-A.”8
But notice the limits of this statement. It does not mean that
the corporation is operating in a manner that is fair to all
corporate constituencies other than stockholders, or that provides
them with any protections. In fact, Hobby Lobby itself won a
case—Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.9—that involved its
controlling stockholders, using their own conscience, denying
Hobby Lobby’s 13,000 full-time workers the ability to use a
personal benefit that comes to them with employment under
secular laws.10 Nothing about Hobby Lobby suggests that the
corporate board had a distinct obligation to think about other
constituencies for itself and to be fair to them. Instead, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued a cursory decision conflating Hobby Lobby
with those who controlled a majority of its equity—its stock.11
This was not, to me, convincing corporate or constitutional law.12
But, the inarguable point is that whatever Hobby Lobby as an
were required to sign a statement of faith—called a Trust
Commitment—before becoming trustees. The express language of the
trust instrument itself also affirms the Christian faith. Thus, the
controlling shareholders (the trusts), as well as the trustees who
control the shareholder-trusts, each memorialized a commitment to
the Christian faith. David Green and three of the Greens’ children
serve as the four directors of Hobby Lobby. They also serve as the
company’s senior executive officers.
7. See Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 2,
at 446–47.
8. Company
Information,
CHICK-FIL-A,
https://www.chick-fila.com/About/Who-We-Are (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
10. See id. at 2765 (concluding the Health and Human Services (HHS)
contraceptives mandate, as applied to for-profit corporations, burdened the
exercise of religion).
11. See id. at 2775 (“By requiring the . . . Greens and their companies to
arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they engage in
conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”).
12. See generally Strine, A Job Is Not a Hobby, supra note 5.
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entity was doing involved making the interests of its controlling
stockholders the end of governance, not the best interests of all
corporate constituencies. And it is no more of a comfort for those
other constituencies when a controlling stockholder maximizes its
idiosyncratic preferences than when a public company with a
diverse base of stockholders puts the best interests of its
stockholders first.
Put differently, Hobby Lobby illustrates why public
companies in fact must put the interests of their equity holders
first. In the case of a controlled company like Hobby Lobby, the
board of Hobby Lobby—which runs an entity distinct from the
Green family13—follows the drumbeat of those who elect it. In the
case of a public company, the power dynamics are identical. But,
what is different is that unlike the Green family, the investor
bases of diverse public companies only have one real thing in
common: they hope to profit from their investment in the
company. These investors most likely have very diverse views
about things like how to treat workers, how much to protect the
environment, and religion. As things now stand, the direct
investors in public companies will not be humans. Instead, they
will typically be mutual funds or pension funds, with no mandate
to make political, religious, and value judgments for their
investors.14
To me, these realities mean that if the “ought” that
Professors Johnson and Millon desire is to become something
more like reality, then changes must be made to the power
dynamics under which all corporations operate. That might mean
changes within corporate statutory law to require—not permit—
the consideration of other constituencies, and to put some teeth
behind that idea. That might mean changes to the obligations of
institutional investors to consider the full range of their human
investors’ interests, including their interest in a sustainable,
responsible system of wealth creation. That might mean
13. The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby. Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
14. See Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, The Changing Preferences of
Institutional Investors for Common Stocks 4 (Mar. 11, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (noting that in 2010, institutional investors owned 67% of all U.S.
public stock) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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enhanced externality protections for workers, consumers,
communities in which the corporation operates, and the
environment. That might mean limiting the ability of
corporations to use other people’s money in a way that
compromises our political system.
For present purposes, less important is the precise how, more
important is “the what.” And “the what” must involve the power
dynamics that act on corporate boards. If the only power within
the corporate polity is wielded by equity capital, then the ends of
governance will maximize equity’s preferences. I do not find it
comforting that the Green family, however well intentioned, can
use their stockholder power to impose their own religious views
on Hobby Lobby’s workers and deny 13,000 full-time workers15—
who need to feed their families—access to health care options
that society has said they should have.16 Nor do I find it
comforting that for-profit corporate boards have been unleashed
to spend funds in the political process when there is no principled
basis to believe that investors bought stock for expressive
purposes, and when actual experience—the failure of corporate
political action committees (PACs) to be able to raise stockholder
funds even though permitted to do so for many years17—
demonstrates that proposition is false.
Like Adolf Berle,18 I like the economically powerful to have
legally
enforceable
duties
to
be
socially
15. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
16. See id. at 2762 (explaining the HHS mandate arose from
recommendations of the Institute of Medicine).
17. Citizens United was decided in part on the ground that corporations are
vehicles for expression by the stockholders. Citizens United v. Federal Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010). But federal law allowed corporations to use
corporate funds to raise money from stockholders for their corporate PACs. 2
U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (defining “contribution” to exclude contributions to
“separate segregated fund[s]” established by corporations, i.e., PACs); see also 11
C.F.R. § 114.2 (2009) (setting out regulations for contributions by corporations,
and by and to their PACs). Precisely because stockholders did not buy stock for
expressive purposes, this truly voluntary approach did not generate stockholder
contributions.
18. E.g., Adolf A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A
Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). Berle argued that if managers were allowed
to consider the interests of constituencies other than stockholders, there would
need to be a regulatory system to hold the mangers accountable:
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responsible.19 In the case of corporations, that means we must do
the hard work of not only making corporate boards accountable
for treating all corporate constituencies with respect and
integrity, but also making corporate stockholders who control
corporations do so. And in today’s world, most Americans are
stockholders not of actual corporations that make products and
deliver services, but of mutual funds and other intermediaries
through their 401(k) retirement plans.20 Any increase in the
social responsibility of corporations will therefore depend
importantly on what obligations institutional investors owe
themselves.
As they continue to seek to increase other-regarding
approaches to corporate management, I urge my friends to
concentrate their lively minds on the ultimate issue of power.
Now I submit that you can not abandon emphasis on “the view that
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for
their stockholders” until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear
and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone
else . . . . Either you have a system based on individual ownership of
property or you do not. If not—and there are at the moment plenty of
reasons why capitalism does not seem ideal—it becomes necessary to
present a system (none has been presented) of law or government, or
both, by which responsibility for control of national wealth and
income is so apportioned and enforced that the community as a
whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is properly taken care of.
Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed under the
corporate form, in the hands of a few thousand directors, and the few
hundred individuals holding “control,” is simply handed over, weakly,
to the present administrators with a pious wish that something nice
will come out of it all.
Id. at 1367–68.
19. See generally Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 4.
20. John Bogle said in a 2009 speech that: “In our old ownership society 92
percent of all stocks were owned by individuals and 8 percent by institutions.
But in today’s agency society, only 24 percent of stocks are owned by individuals,
with the remaining 76 percent held by institutions.” John C. Bogle, Founder &
Former Chief Executive, The Vanguard Grp., Speech Before IA Compliance
Summit
(March
13,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
https://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp20090313.html). As of June 2014, 401(k)
plans held $4.8 trillion in assets on behalf of 52 million active participants, and
64% of these assets were invested in mutual funds. Frequently Asked Questions
About
401(k)
Plans,
INV.
COMPANY
INST.,
https://www.ici.org/policy/retirement/plan/401k/faqs_401k (last visited Apr. 2,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Without addressing the power structure to which corporate
managers are accountable, the “ought” Professors Johnson and
Millon want cannot become reality. It remains a matter of debate
whether, as a positive matter, the boards of directors of public
companies in the United States must make stockholder welfare
the end of corporate governance.21 For some commentators, even
the directors of Delaware corporations may govern the firm on a
multi-constituency model, where the stockholders are just one of
many corporate constituencies, any one of which may be
considered not just a means, but an end of corporate
management.22 They argue this despite the reality that the
Delaware General Corporation Law gives only stockholders
rights, such as the right to elect directors,23 vote on major
transactions,24 and enforce fiduciary duties.25 They argue that
legions of Delaware judges have just gotten their own law
wrong.26
21. See Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that
“corporate purpose remains an unsettled topic evoking fierce debate”).
22. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 95–115
(2012) (arguing that boards may consider stockholders as just one of several
constituencies and interests whose best interests may be an end of corporate
governance); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 288 (1999)
Corporate law does not treat directors as shareholders’ agents but as
something quite different: independent hierarchs who are charged not
with serving shareholders’ interests alone, but with serving the
interests of the legal entity known as the “corporation.” The interests
of the corporation, in turn, can be understood as a joint welfare
function of all the individuals who make firm-specific investments
and agree to participate in the extracontractual, internal mediation
process within the firm.
23. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2016) (establishing stockholder
right to elect directors).
24. See id. § 251(c) (requiring stockholder vote for mergers); id. § 271
(requiring stockholder vote for sale of all or substantially all assets).
25. See id. § 327 (creating stockholder right to initiate a suit on behalf of a
corporation).
26. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 22, at 30–31 (arguing that Revlon proves
that “it is only when a public corporation is about to stop being a public
corporation that directors lose the protection of the business judgment rule and
must embrace shareholder wealth as their only goal”); Blair & Stout, supra note
22,at 308 (“Unocal squarely rejects shareholder primacy in favor of the view
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In making these arguments, the power structure established
by the corporate statute itself is slighted and seen as having no
bearing on the duties owed by directors, or of the normative
objective of corporate law itself. These arguments, as I have
explained elsewhere,27 have the quality of wish-fulfillment about
them, as if saying that what one believes the law “ought” to be is
in fact what it “is.” Confounding this dream world is the real
world, where the realities of the power dynamics created by
corporate law itself dictate the ends of corporate governance.
One phenomenon that bears on this question, but has gotten
little consideration by those who wish that American corporate
directors could in fact make the well-being of other corporate
constituencies—such as workers, consumer, or society more
generally—an end of corporate governance equal to that of
stockholder welfare, is the wave of corporate inversions.28
It is widely known that many expenditures most critical to
the well-being of actual human beings in our society are made by
our government on our collective behalf. Care for the most
that the interests of the ‘corporation’ include the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies.”); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public
Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 849–50 (2005)
[S]ome of the Revlon language suggests that the Delaware Supreme
Court thought that normally nonshareholder interests could be
considered only when rationally related to shareholder
interests . . . [but] Delaware case law in fact does not make
shareholder interests controlling and thus allows consideration of
nonshareholder interests other than just when that happens to
maximize shareholder value.
Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 107, 143–44 (2014) (“[B]eyond Revlon’s narrow scope—covering
only ‘sale or change in control’ transactions—the business judgment rule affords
corporate directors ample discretion to make decisions that serve the interests of
non-shareholder stakeholders.”).
27. See generally Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 4 (noting that
under the Delaware General Corporation Law, no constituency other than
stockholders is given any power).
28. See Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax
Inversions, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (“A
corporate inversion is a transaction in which a U.S. based multinational
restructures so that the U.S. parent is replaced by a foreign parent, in order to
avoid U.S. taxes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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vulnerable. Schools for children. The military and police who
protect us. The regulatory agencies that help keep the
environment clean, workers and consumers safe, and the markets
free of fraud. The transportation systems, the public parks, the
museums, the orchestras. The economic help to disabled workers,
the elderly, the poor. The list could and perhaps should go on. But
you get the point.
If it were the case therefore—as a positive description of the
corporate governance system that we have—that corporate
boards actually care about other corporate constituencies, we
should not expect that corporate tax avoidance would be a high
priority. Most of all, we would not expect that it would rise to
such a priority level that the corporation would abandon the
nation and state that chartered it in the first place in order to
redomicile in another jurisdiction. That is especially the case if
redomiciling did not involve a desire to go to another jurisdiction
where the corporation would pay more taxes that would then go
to benefit more of the corporation’s constituencies, but instead
redomiciling to known tax havens that seek to attract
corporations by not taxing them much at all. It could not be that
other-regarding corporate boards would seek to deepen a cycle of
international tax arbitrage, where corporations seek to play
nations off against each other, with the goal of reducing the
extent to which corporations and their equity owners pay taxes,
and therefore, forcing governments to either look to others to
make up the shortfall or to cut services to its citizens. If in fact
corporate boards were in an accountability system that was not
exclusively focused on stockholder welfare, how can it be that
renunciations of national identity and obligations this stark
would occur?
But, in just the past four years, more than twenty American
corporations redomiciled into other nations for the purpose of
reducing the taxes they would pay.29 These American
29. See Zachary Mider & Jesse Drucker, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion (last updated Apr. 6, 2016,
5:15 PM) (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Tracking Tax Runaways, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/infographics/tax-runaways-trackinginversions.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (finding that since 2006, fifty-one U.S.
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corporations were not only incorporated in Delaware,30 many
were incorporated in jurisdictions that have statutes that make
the interests of other constituencies a discretionary object of the
board’s beneficence.31 But, although these states give lip service
to other constituencies, their statutes give those constituencies no
power.32 They only give power to stockholders.
Nor is there a conscience-salving retort to this phenomenon.
It is not the case that these corporations intend to give the
reduced taxes they pay to charities they believe will help the poor
more than the government, or to schools, or to those—like the
profoundly disabled—who need life-long support. There is only

companies have redomiciled) (on file with the Washington & Lee Law Review).
30. A few examples of companies that have recently redomiciled out of
states with constituency statutes include the following. Mylan, which
redomiciled in 2015, was a Pennsylvania corporation. Mylan Inc., Annual
Report Pursuant (Form 10-K) (Apr. 30, 2015). Pennsylvania has a constituency
statute, providing that directors may consider “[t]he effects of any action upon
any or all groups affected by such action, including shareholders, members,
employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon
communities in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are
located.” 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 515 (2016). Medtronic, which redomiciled in 2015,
was a Minnesota corporation. Medtronic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (June
20, 2014). Minnesota has a statute providing that “a director may, in
considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the
corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the
state and nation, community and societal considerations.” MINN. STAT. §
302A.251 (Subd. 5) (2016). Actavis, which redomiciled in 2013, was a Nevada
corporation. Actavis, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2013). Nevada
has a statute providing that directors may consider “(a) The interests of the
corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and customers; (b) The economy of
the State and Nation; (c) The interests of the community and of society; and (d)
The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its
stockholders . . . .” NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (2010).
31. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow
Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 124 (1999) (identifying
twenty-nine states with constituency statutes, including Pennsylvania, Nevada,
and Minnesota in the appendix); see also H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson,
Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover
Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1540–45 (1991) (summarizing
constituency statutes in appendix).
32. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 463–64 (2006) (noting that most constituency statutes
are limited in scope, are permissive and do not require the board to give weight
to outside interests, and do not give stockholders enforceable rights).
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one justification for this conduct, which is to have the corporation
reduce the obligations it owes to society.33
Without wishing to condemn any corporation that has
“inverted” itself into a citizen of a nation other than our own, I
simply wish to point out the obvious. The boards of these
corporations believed that the republic they were governing owed
its loyalty to its only citizens, and those citizens are called
stockholders. The boards of these corporations did not view
themselves as having any national loyalties or loyalties to other
constituencies, they viewed themselves as elected officials in the
republic of equity capital.
If we want a world where that is not the case, then we must
do the hard work of giving more power to other corporate
constituencies, both within and without corporate law. Using the
relative luxury of an academic, journalistic, or legal position to
promote the idea that the world would improve for workers,
consumers, communities, and the environment if corporate
boards simply realized that they could govern corporations by
treating these interests as if they were equal to stockholders does
nothing but impede the more difficult job of reform that must be
done. The only way to make the world be more like it ought to be
is to be willing to be clear-eyed about what it is.

33. Of course, big corporations are not the only ones who talk a good game
about social responsibility but take action to avoid paying taxes to the society
that nurtured it. Consider in that respect, the world’s leading Dutch rock band,
U2, led by social activist Bono. Mary Anastasia O’Grady, ‘Bono Needs to Pay
Up,’ WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142
4052702304259304576373771000025408 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Etsy, a corporation that touts itself as a
certified B Corporation committed to goals other than profit, inverted part of its
operations to a tax haven. Etsy’s decision is difficult to rationalize on any social
responsibility grounds, and instead is simply a way to increase profits by cutting
the corporation’s taxes. Those taxes, of course, fund social services,
environmental protection, and other social goods critical to society. Suzanne
Kapner, Etsy Faces Pressure to Abandon Irish Tax Strategy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/etsy-faces-pressure-to-abandon-irish-taxstrategy-1441080008 (last visited Apr. 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).

